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DENYING FIFTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS TO WITNESSES FACING
FOREIGN PROSECUTIONS: SELF-
INCRIMINATION DISCRIMINATION?
United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998).
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Balsys,1 the Supreme Court held that a
witness could not invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination during a Department ofJustice in-
quiry into his activities during World War II when he reasonably
feared that his testimony would incriminate him under the laws
2of a foreign country.
By a seven to two vote, the Court held that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied only
when either the sovereign seeking to compel the witness's testi-
mony was the same sovereign that would use the testimony
against the witness, or when the compelling and the using sov-
ereigns were both bound by the Fifth Amendment.! In so hold-
ing, the majority interpreted this "same sovereign" rule as being
consistent with the relevant precedents, most notably with Mur-
phy v. Waterfront Commission.4
This Note argues that the majority misread Murphy and
other precedents, and that its holding fails to recognize some of
the essential policies and purposes behind the privilege. As
Murphy noted, the privilege seeks, among other things, to pre-
vent the government from abusing its power in seeking to build
a case against a defendant, and from forcing a witness into the
"cruel trilemma" of having to choose between self-
1 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998).
2 a at 2235-36.
Sd. at 2223-26.
4 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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incrimination, perjury, and contempt.5 Neither of these policy
goals were served by refusing to allow Balsys to invoke the privi-
lege. The United States government has a strong incentive to
abuse its power in building a case against defendants like Balsys
due to its extensive cooperation with foreign governments in
the prosecution of war criminals. In addition, a witness faces
the "cruel trilemma" at the moment that he is forced to choose
between perjury, self-incrimination, and contempt, regardless of
where his prosecution will ultimately take place.? Therefore, the
policies behind the Fifth Amendment privilege suggest that the
majority erred in not allowing Balsys to invoke the privilege.
The majority contends that allowing Balsys to invoke the
privilege would disrupt the balance between governmental and
private interests which is achieved when the government is al-
lowed to exchange a witness's right to silence with a grant of
immunity.8 Such an exchange would be impossible when a wit-
ness faces foreign prosecution, since the United States cannot
enforce its grant of domestic immunity abroad.9
However, this Note argues that the United States could
overcome this problem in many cases by granting a kind of con-
structive immunity to witnesses who fear foreign prosecution.
The United States could do this by taking certain steps to ensure
that neither the testimony nor its fruits can be used against the
witness in a foreign prosecution. 1° In addition, this Note argues
that where the United States government cannot grant a witness
such constructive immunity, it lacks the authority under the
Constitution to compel the witness's testimony.
'I& at 54.
6See, e.g., Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2242-43 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 119 F.Sd 122, 129 (2nd Cir. 1997).
8 Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2232.
9Id




A. EARLY INTERPRETATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution reads, in relevant
part: "no person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.. ."1 There is virtually no legislative
history of the Amendment, so in order to determine whether
the privilege against self-incrimination protects a witness from
providing testimony which might be used against him in a for-
eign prosecution, we must turn to judicial interpretation of the
Amendment.
1. Applying the Privilege in the Interfederal Context
Before United States v. Balsys,12 the Supreme Court had never
directly addressed the question of the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to cases involving fear of foreign prosecu-
tion. Over the past two centuries, however, it has addressed an
analogous issue: whether "one jurisdiction in our federal struc-
ture may compel a witness to give testimony which might in-
criminate him under the laws of another [such] jurisdiction."
13
The Court first addressed this issue in United States v. Saline
Bank of Virginia.14 In Saline Bank, the federal government, seek-
ing to recover certain bank deposits, brought suit in federal
court against the bank and a number of its stockholders.' 5 The
Court held that the defendants could refuse to answer questions
posed to them by the United States in federal court, "where the
defendants claimed that their responses would result in in-
crimination under the laws of Virginia." 6 The Court noted that
"the rule clearly is, that a party is not bound to make any discov-
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
'2 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998).
"Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 54 (1964).
'4 United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S. 100, 104 (1828).
'-'Id at 100.
16 Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2225 (citing Saline Bank, 26 U.S. at 104).
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ery which would expose him to penalties, and this case falls
within it.'
17
There has been considerable controversy over the exact
meaning and scope of the Saline Bank holding. At various times,
the Supreme Court has noted that Saline Bank was concerned
strictly with the interpretation and administration of a self-
incrimination clause in a Virginia statute, and did not mention
the Fifth Amendment. 8 At other times, however, the Court has
interpreted Saline Bank more broadly, reading it as applying the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to bar the
compulsion of a witness's testimony by one jurisdiction in the
federal structure, when the testimony sought would incriminate
the witness in another such jurisdiction. 9
In Ballmann v. Fagin, the Court adopted the latter, more
broad reading of Saline Bank, holding that a witness could not
be compelled to provide testimony in a federal criminal investi-
gation which would incriminate him under state or federal law.
Ballmann involved a federal grand jury investigation into the
criminal liability of a national bank employee for the disappear-
ance of cash from the bank vaults.2 ' When the grand jury or-
dered the employee to produce a certain cash book or to answer
questions designed to prove his possession or control of the
cash book, he refused to do so on the ground that either would
incriminate him in an Ohio state proceeding which had already
been brought against him. Citing Saline Bank, the Court held
that the employee could not lawfully be compelled to produce
the incriminating cash book or to acknowledge his possession of
it, as he "was exonerated from disclosures which would have ex-
posed him to the penalties of the state law."23 The Court noted
that the information contained in the cash book might be in-
17 Saline Bank, 26 U.S. at 104.
" See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2225 (1998); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 69 (1906).
"9 See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 58 (1964); Ballmann v.
Fagin, 200 U.S. 186, 195 (1906).






criminating under federal law as well.24 However, the employee
did not raise this possibility in his invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination, and it was not the exclusive (or, ar-
guably, even the primary) focus of the Court's holding.2 The
Court held that whether he was motivated to withhold his cash
book for fear of federal or state prosecution, "we are of the
opinion that Ballmann could not be required to produce his
cash book if he set up that it would tend to incriminate him.2 6
In Bram v. United States,27 the Court addressed the question
of whether the Fifth Amendment prevented the federal gov-
ernment from using a witness's self-incriminating testimony
against him in a federal prosecution when the testimony was
compelled by foreign authorities.28 In Bram, the defendant was
accused of murdering several people on the high seas. He was
interrogated by Canadian authorities in Nova Scotia, who co-
erced his confession by stripping him of his clothes and telling
him that he had already been implicated by a shipmate, and
that it would be better for him to testify truthfully regarding his
participation in the crime.2 The Court held that, under the cir-
cumstances, the defendant's confession was non-voluntary and
improperly coerced, and that the Fifth Amendment therefore
prevented the federal government from using the confession as
evidence against the defendant.0 In reaching its holding, the
Court focused upon the effect of the coercion on the voluntari-
ness of the defendant's confession, 3' and not upon the jurisdic-
tion wherein the coercion occurred.
It may have revealed that the employee was an abettor of the thief, which would
make him guilty of a misdemeanor under then existing federal law. Id.
The Court speculated that "not impossibly Ballmann took this aspect of the mat-
ter for granted, as one which could be perceived by the Court without his disagreea-
bly emphasizing his own fears." Id.
168 U.S. 532 (1897).
id at 537.
a1 at 539.
so Id. at 565.




In the late nineteenth century, the Court estblished that
the federal government may compel a witness to give self-
incriminating testimony, notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment
privilege, if it grants the witness an immunity from criminal
prosecution based upon his testimony that is co-extensive with
the protections guaranteed by the privilege. 2 In Counselman v.
Hitchcock3 3 a federal grand jury called a corporate officer to tes-
tify regarding his company's alleged violation of federal laws
governing interstate commerce.34 A federal statute then in exis-
tence provided, in relevant part, that:
no pleading of a party, nor any discovery or evidence obtained from
a party by means of a judicial proceeding in this or any foreign country,
shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against him or his
property or estate, in any court of the United States, in any criminal pro-
ceeding, or for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture... 
The corporate officer refused to testify despite the existence
of the immunity statute, however, claiming that the statute
would not guarantee him the full range of protection against
self-incrimination granted by the Fifth Amendment. The
Court ruled that an immunity statute can replace the Fifth
Amendment privilege only if it provides a protection that has
the "same extent in scope and effect" as the privilege itself, by
providing a "complete protection from all of the perils against
which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard.57
The Court concluded that in order to achieve this, an immunity
statute must provide "absolute immunity against future prosecu-
" Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896).
33 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
31Id. at 547-48.
3' Id. at 560.
'6Id. at 559.
37 Id. at 585-86. A grant of transactional immunity by the government in exchange
for a witness's testimony makes it impossible for the government to prosecute the de-
fendant for any transaction, matter, or thing relating to his testimony. In other
words, upon granting a witness transactional immunity, the government cannot
prosecute the witness for any crimes revealed through his testimony, even if it subse-
quently obtained incriminating evidence from a wholly independent source.
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don for the offense to which the [compelled testimony] re-
lates." u Reasoning that the statute in question would allow the
witness to be prosecuted for the offense to which his testimony
related, and that it would not prevent federal authorities from
using his compelled testimony to gain knowledge of "sources of
information which might supply other means of convicting
[him]," the Court ruled that the statute was not co-extensive
with the Fifth Amendment privilege. 9 The Court therefore
held that the railroad officer could refuse to testify.40
In Brown v. Walker,4' the Court upheld the federal govern-
ment's right to compel a witness's testimony pursuant to an
immunity statute that was co-extensive with the Fifth Amend-
ment protection against self-incrimination.42 The federal im-
munity statute in question, which was devised in response to
Counselman, granted the witness full transactional immunity
from prosecution for the offense to which his testimony per-
tained.43 On facts virtually identical to those in Counselman, the
Court held by a five to four margin that the immunity statute in
question provided the full range of protection guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment, and that the witness could be compelled
to testify under such a grant of immunity.44 The Court reasoned
that the Fifth Amendment privilege existed strictly to protect a
witness "against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict
him of a criminal charge," and that such protection is fully
achieved when the witness receives a pardon for the offense or a
guarantee that his testimony cannot be used in a criminal




4" 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
12 Id. at 608-09.
"Id. at 609.
"Id. at 608.
,Id. at 597-98. The Court eventually retreated from the strong claim that only full
transactional immunity could replace the Fifth Amendment protection. In Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Court held that use and derivative use immu-
nity would suffice. Id. at 458-59. In addition, the Kastigar Court articulated the policy
rationale for allowing the government to exchange immunity for the right to compel
otherwise privileged testimony, stating that immunity statutes:
1101
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ment that the federal immunity statute would not provide the
same degree of protection as would the Fifth Amendment, as it
would leave the witness open to state prosecution based upon
his testimony.4 The Court stated that given the supremacy of
federal law over state law, the transactional immunity guaran-
teed by the federal statute should extend to all courts in the
land.47 However, the Court concluded that even if prosecution
in a state court were a possibility, such a possibility was too re-
mote and insubstantial a danger to be recognized by the privi-
lege
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAME SOVEREIGN RULE
1. Early Doctrine
In the early to mid-twentieth century, the Court began to
depart from the conclusion it had reached in Saline Bank and
Ballmann regarding the application of the privilege against self-
incrimination between state and federal jurisdictions. In a se-
ries of cases, the Court either held or suggested that the privi-
lege protected a defendant from compelled self-incrimination
only when-the sovereign seeking to compel his testimony was
the same sovereign seeking to prosecute him based upon his
testimony. The first such case was Jack v. Kansas,49 decided some
six weeks before Ballmann. The defendant in Jack was a coal
mine operator charged with engaging in a price-fixing scheme
under a Kansas anti-trust statute.50  The statute in question
granted a defendant full immunity from state prosecution in
exchange for the State's right to compel the defendant's self-
seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and the legiti-
mate demands of government to compel citizens to testify. The existence of these stat-
utes reflects the importance of testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of such a
character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated
in the crime.
I& at 445.6 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896).
47 Id
481d
' 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
o Id. at 373.
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incriminating testimony.5' When the State sought to compel the
defendant's testimony, the defendant refused to testify, claiming
that the statutory grant of immunity was not broad enough to
prevent his compelled testimony from being used against him in
a federal anti-trust prosecution. The Court held that the State
could compel the defendant's testimony, as the danger of fed-
eral prosecution based upon the compelled testimony was "un-
substantial and remote.5 3 The Court stated that it perceived the
privilege against self-incrimination as applying "to a prosecution
in the same jurisdiction, and when [legal immunity from such
prosecution] is fully given it is enough."54
Following similar reasoning, four subsequent Supreme
Court cases held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination applied only when the threat of future prose-
cution based upon compelled testimony came from the same
jurisdiction or sovereignty which was seeking to compel the tes-
timony.55 First, in Hale v. Henke 57 when a federal grand jury
sought to compel a witness's testimony, the witness invoked the
privilege on the ground that the applicable federal immunity
statute did not protect him from prosecution in the New York
state courts. The district court held the witness in contempt
for refusing to testify.58 Based in part upon a questionable ap-
plication of Brown and Jack, the Court affirmed the district
court's ruling and held that the failure to protect against state
prosecution did not invalidate a federal immunity statute and
therefore did not limit the federal government's power to com-
pel the witness's testimony.59
Id. at 382.
"Id at 374.




"Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141,
148 (1931); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 492 (1944); Knapp v. Schweitzer,
357 U.S. 371, 379 (1958).
mHae, 201 U.S. at 43.
17 Id. at 66-69.
5Ia
59 I& at 69.
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In United States v. Murdock,60 the Court reaffirmed the "same
sovereign" rule which it had announced in Hale.6 In Murdock,
the defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege in a fed-
eral Internal Revenue Bureau examination because he feared
that his testimony might incriminate him under state law.62 The
Court held that the defendant could not refuse to testify based
upon his fear of state prosecution.
The Court pointed to two lines of cases as precedent for its
holding. First, the court cited two English common law cases,
decided after the adoption of the American Constitution, as es-
tablishing that "the English rule of evidence against compulsory
self-incrimination, on which historically that contained in the
Fifth Amendment rests, does not protect witnesses against dis-
closing offenses in violation of the laws of another country."6
Second, the Court stated that it had already held that the valid-
ity of federal immunity statutes did not depend upon their con-
ferring a grant of immunity from state prosecution, and that the
validity of state immunity statutes did not depend upon their
conferring a grant of immunity from federal prosecution. The
court concluded that "full and complete immunity against
prosecution by the government compelling the witness to an-
swer is equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule against
compulsory self-incrimination. '' 6
In a pair of decisions written by Justice Frankfurter, the
Court continued to uphold this "same sovereign" rule, recasting
it as a necessary consequence of the fundamental principles of
federalism.67 First, in Feldman v. United States,68 the Court applied
the same sovereign analysis in its consideration of a novel issue:
whether a defendant's testimony could be used against him in a
6 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
6, Id at 149.
62 Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
Id (citing King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 61 Eng. Rep. 116, 128 (1851)).
6Id.
67 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375-81 (1957); Feldman v. United States, 322
U.S. 487, 490-93 (1944).
66322 U.S. 487 (1944).
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federal prosecution when the testimony had been compelled in
a state proceeding under a grant of immunity from state prose-
cution.69 The Court answered in the affirmative, upholding a
federal conviction for mail fraud which was based in part on
self-incriminating testimony supplied by the defendant during
supplemental proceedings in a New York state court pursuant to
a state grant of immunity.70 The Court ruled that the immunity
from prosecution, like the privilege against testifying which it
supplants, pertains only to a prosecution in the same jurisdic-
tion.71 Reasoning that the Bill of Rights was meant solely to limit
the powers of the federal government and was not applicable to
the states,7 2 and that "the Constitution prohibits an invasion of
privacy only in proceedings over which the [federal] Govern-
ment has control," 3 the Court ruled that federal prosecutors
could make use of evidence or testimony which had been ob-
tained by state authorities in violation of the principles estab-
lished by the Bill of Rights, so long as the federal authorities did
not participate in the offending extraction of that evidence or
testimony.7 4 The Court saw this rule as a direct consequence of
the basic principles of federalism: state immunity statutes could
not limit or constrain federal prosecutions, and federal immu-
nity statutes could not limit or constrain state prosecutions, as
"the distinctive operations of the two governments within their
respective spheres is basic to our federal constitutional system."75
In Knapp v. Schweitzer,76 the Court extended the implications
of the same sovereign rule even further. In Knapp, the Court
upheld a conviction holding a defendant in contempt for refus-
ing to testify against himself before a state grand jury after re-
ceiving a grant of immunity from state prosecution. The
defendant had argued that the state grant of immunity would
6Id. at 488.7 0 Id at 492-94.
7' Id at 493.
72 Id. at 490 (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 246 (1828)).
7
3 Id. at 492.
7 4 
d.
' Id. at 490.
76 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
7 Id. at 381.
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not protect him from federal prosecution, and that a federal
prosecuting attorney had already announced his intention of
cooperating with state officials in the prosecution of the crime
at issue.7" The Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not
protect the defendant from testifying in the state proceeding,
despite his reasonable fear of subsequent federal prosecution.
9
In reaching its holding, the court stated that
[t] he sole-although deeply valuable-purpose of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is the security of the individual
against the exertion of the power of the Federal Government to compel
incriminating testimony with a view to enabling that same Government
to convict a man out of his own mouth.80
The Knapp Court reasserted the federalist principles that
had informed its decision in Feldman."' The Court noted, how-
ever, that "the Federal Government may not take advantage of
this recognition of the States' autonomy in order to evade the
Bill of Rights." 82 For example, the Court stated that if a federal
officer were "a party to the compulsion of testimony by state
agencies," then the Fifth Amendment would apply to bar the
use of the compelled testimony in a federal proceeding.8 In
addition, the Court implied that under certain circumstances a
defendant might be able to invoke his Fifth Amendment right
not to testify in a state proceeding if the collaboration between
state and federal prosecuting authorities rose to such a level that
the state was used as an agent of federal prosecution or investi-
gation. 4 However, the court declined to explore this issue fur-
ther or to develop a bright-line rule, as the record in the case
before it did not contain evidence of anything approaching that
degree of cooperation between state and federal authorities."
8 Id at 373.
7Id at 380-81.
'0 Id at 380.
8, I& at 379-81.






The Court called the foundations of Feldman and Knapp
into question when it decided Malloy v. Hogan, in which it held
that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination
was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridg-
ment by the states. In Malloy, the Court stated that the shift to
the federal standard in state cases "reflects [the] recognition
that the American system of criminal prosecution is accusato-
rial, not inquisitorial, and that the Fifth Amendment privilege is
its essential mainstay."8 The Court held that the privilege
against self-incrimination was an essential principle of free gov-
ernment and not merely a rule of evidence which was motivated
and justified by expediency,89 noting that "the freedom from
conviction based upon coerced confessions" perpetuated "prin-
ciples of humanity and civil liberty."' °
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,9' the Court returned to
the question presented in Hale, Murdock, and Knapp; namely,
whether one jurisdiction within the federal structure may com-
pel a witness, whom it has immunized against prosecution un-
der its laws, to give testimony which might then be used to
convict him of a crime in another such jurisdiction. 2 The Court
rejected the same sovereign rule announced in the earlier cases,
and ruled that the Fifth Amendment protected a witness from
federal prosecution on the basis of self-incriminating testimony
compelled in a state proceeding, thereby overruling Feldman
93
Therefore, because this exclusionary rule eliminated the possi-
bility of self-incrimination in another jurisdiction by guarantee-
ing immunity in both state and federal courts, the court ruled
that a witness could be compelled to testify against himself in a
state proceeding under a grant of immunity.94
6378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Id. at 6.
" Id. at 7.
"Id. at 9.
Id. (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1966)).






In reaching its holding, the Murphy Court examined the
policies and purposes of the Fifth Amendment.95 The Court
identified the following seven basic policies-or fundamental
values and aspirations-advanced by the Fifth Amendment:
Our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel tri-
lemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an ac-
cusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear
that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment
and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual
balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until
good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government
in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load;" our respect
for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each in-
dividual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life;" our dis-
trust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege
... is often "a protection to the innocent."
96
The Court concluded that "most, if not all, of these policies
and purposes are defeated when a witness 'can be whipsawed
into incriminating himself under both state and federal law
even though' the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination is applicable to each. 97 Therefore, as Malloy had
held the Fifth Amendment applicable against the states, the
Murphy Court announced that it was necessary to reconsider the
same sovereign rule established in Murdock and its progeny,
which would allow such "whipsaw" convictions.98
However, the Murphy Court did not see its rejection of the
same sovereign rule merely as a necessary consequence of Mal-
loy; rather, it attacked the pre-Malloy same sovereign cases on
independent grounds.' Specifically, the Court asserted that the
same sovereign approach advocated in Hale, Murdock, Feldman,
and Knapp was inconsistent with the basic policies of the Fifth
"' Id. The Court stated that the answer to the question presented "depends upon"
whether allowing the compulsion of testimony in one jurisdiction within our federal
structure which could incriminate the witness in another such jurisdiction "promotes
or defeats the fifth amendment's policies and purposes." Id. at 54.
Id. at 55 (citations omitted).





Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and was unsup-
ported by precedent.1°° The Murphy Court argued that both
English common law cases and earlier Supreme Court cases es-
tablished that the Fifth Amendment extended its protection
against self-incrimination to witnesses whose testimony would
incriminate them in anotherjurisdiction.10 1
With respect to the English cases, the Court discussed two
pre-Constitutional cases, 10 2 and two cases decided after the fram-
ing of the Constitution 0 In East India Co. v. Campbell, the de-
fendant refused to provide certain information in a proceeding
in an English court on the ground that it might subject him to
punishment in the courts of India.' The English court held
that the privilege against self-incrimination protected the de-
fendant from giving the testimony, citing to the broad principle
that "this court shall not oblige one to discover that which...
will subject him to the punishment of a crime."'05 Similarly, in
Brownsword v. Edwards, the defendant refused to reveal whether
she was lawfully married to a certain man, on the ground that if
she admitted to the marriage she would be confessing to an act
which, although legal under the English common law, would
render her liable to prosecution in an ecclesiastical court.'6
The court allowed her to refuse to testify about her marriage,
reasoning that "the general rule is, that no one is bound to an-
swer so as to subject himself to punishment, whether that pun-
ishment arises by the ecclesiastical law of the land. 10 7
In King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, the defendants resisted
discovery of certain information in an English court which
might subject them to prosecution under the laws of Sicily."' 8
100 Id.
101 Id
101 East India v. Campbell, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (1749); Brownsword v. Edwards, 28
Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750).
'03 King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851); United States v.
McCrae, L.R. 3 Ch. App. 79 (1867). See also note 64, supra, and accompanying text.
10 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 56.
'0 East India, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1011.
" Brownsword, 28 Eng. Rep. at 157-58.
'07 Id at 158.
o King of the Two Sicilies, 61 Eng. Rep. at 117.
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The court denied their assertion of privilege, reasoning that it
was impossible for the court to tell from the record whether the
testimony would in fact tend to subject the defendants to prose-
cution under Sicilian law, and that the possibility of such prose-
cution wholly depended upon the defendant's voluntary return
to Sicily.'9 The King of the Two Sicilies court stated that
the rule [against self-incrimination] ... is one which exists merely by vir-
tue of our own municipal law, and must, I think, have reference exclu-
sively to matters penal by that law: to matters as to which, if disclosed, the
Judge would be able to say, as a matter of law, whether it could or could
not entail penal consequences.1n
However, United States v. McCrae called into question the
sweep of this statement.1' In that case, the United States sued
in an English court for an accounting and the payment of mon-
eys allegedly received by the defendant as an agent of the Con-
federate States during the Civil War."2 The defendant refused
to answer questions on the ground that to do so would subject
him to penalties under the laws of the United States."5  The
United States relied on King of the Two Sicilies, arguing that the
privilege against self-incrimination applied only where "a person
might expose himself to the peril of a penal proceeding in this
country (England).""' The Lord Chancellor sustained the de-
fendant's claim of privilege and distinguished the case from
King of the Two Sicilies on the grounds that, in McCrae, the possi-
bility of incrimination under foreign law was far better estab-
lished, and that the McCrae defendant would have been
involuntarily subject to such incrimination. 5  The McCrae
Chancellor limited King of the Two Sicilies to its facts, and re-
jected the King of the Two Sicilies court's "unnecessarily broad"
9 Id. at 128.
"' Id. (internal quotations omitted).
' United States v. McCrae, LR. 3 Ch. App. 79 (1867).
112 Id.
11 Id.
. Id. at 83-84.
"' Id. at 84-87. As a resident of the United States, he would not have to choose to
return voluntarily to a distant jurisdiction in order to face prosecution, as did the de-
fendants in King of the Two Sicilies. Id.
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statement which had implied a same sovereign interpretation of
the rule against self-incrimination.
16
In Murphy, the Court read these English cases as firmly es-
tablishing that the rule against self-incrimination was meant to
apply when a defendant fears prosecution in a jurisdiction sepa-
rate from the jurisdiction seeking to compel his testimony, and
as firmly rejecting the same sovereign rule announced in Mur-
dock and its progeny. 7 The Court noted that King of the Two Si-
cilies was the only English case to suggest the same sovereign
rule, and that McCrae had limited that case to its particular
facts. 8 In addition, the Murphy Court concluded that to the ex-
tent that King of the Two Sicilies was intended to stand broadly for
a same sovereign rule regarding self-incrimination, it was over-
ruled by McCrae.'19
The Murphy Court also argued that the early Supreme Court
cases addressing the issue of the application of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to cases involving fear of prosecution in
another jurisdiction eschewed the same sovereign rule as con-
vincingly as did the English cases. 20 The Court interpreted Sa-
line Bank2' as a Fifth Amendment case which "squarely" held
that the privilege applied when a federal court sought to com-
pel testimony which could incriminate the witness in a state
court.122 The Murphy Court further stated that this rule was reaf-
firmed in Ballmann,'2 and it distinguished Jack as a Fourteenth
Amendment case whose holding did not depend upon Fifth
Amendment issues.'24 The Court rejected the Hale and Murdock
readings of the English and early American precedents (on
which Feldman and Knapp relied), and concluded that the great
weight of precedential authority, both English and American,
supported the extension of the privilege against self-
116d
,,7 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964).
u Id. at 62.
" Id. at 62-63.
" Id. at 59-60.
See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
2 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 60.
"'Id. at 65.
", Id. at 64-65.
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incrimination to defendants who fear that their compelled tes-
timony will be used against them in another jurisdiction within
the federal structure.' 25 The Court concluded that "the authori-
ties relied on by the Court in Hale v. Henkel provided no support
for the conclusion that under the Fifth Amendment the only
danger to be considered is one arising within the same jurisdic-
tion and under the same sovereignty."1
26
C. DIVISION IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
While no Supreme Court case before Balsys had addressed
the question of whether the Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination extended to a witness who fears that
testimony he provided in a domestic proceeding will be used
against him in a foreign criminal proceeding, federal appellate
courts did address this question.127 These courts came to differ-
ent conclusions.
In United States v. (UNDER SEAL)(Araneta),128 the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the Fifth Amendment does not protect a witness
facing a substantial risk of foreign prosecution from compelled
sef-incrimination.12 In reaching its holding, the court reasoned
that "the Fifth Amendment privilege applies only where the sov-
ereign compelling the testimony and the sovereign using the
testimony are both restrained by the Fifth Amendment from
compelling self-incrimination," and not when the sovereign us-
ing the testimony is a foreign government which is not bound
by the Amendment.30 In support of this conclusion, the court
pointed to several Supreme Court cases which had been de-
cided before the Fifth Amendment had been incorporated
against the states.'3' In those cases, the Court had held that the
'2' Id. at 65-77.
12 Id. at 68.
'27 See, e.g., Balsys v. United States, 119 F.3d 122 (2nd Cir. 1997); United States v.
Gecas, 50 F.d 1549 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. (Under Seal) (Araneta), 794
F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot
sub nom., Parker v. United States, 397 U.S. 96 (1970).
"a 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986).





Fifth Amendment did not forbid the federal government from
compelling testimony that would incriminate a witness under
state law or forbid a state government from compelling testi-
mony that would incriminate a witness under federal law.32 The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that, since it was "only when the Fifth
Amendment was held applicable to the states [that] the privi-
lege [was] held to protect a witness in state or federal court
from incriminating himself under either federal or state law,"'33,
the amendment only protected a witness from self-incrimination
when both the compelling sovereign and the using sovereign
were bound by the amendment, and not when the using sover-
eign was a foreign country not bound by the amendment.13
In In re Parker,'5 the Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclu-
sion. The court held that the Fifth Amendment does not pro-
tect against self-incrimination for acts made criminal by the laws
of a foreign nation.136 The court contended that a contrary
holding could result in unpalatable consequences, as it would
render domestic investigations subservient to the whim of for-
eign criminal law. 3 7 For example, a foreign country might de-
clare it a crime for one of its foreign agents to fail in a mission
of sabotage or to confess his crimes to American investigators.
The court reasoned that allowing the privilege to shield the tes-
timony of such foreign criminals would thwart important law
enforcement endeavors and subvert the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment.'38
In United States v. Gecas,139 however, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination protected a witness from giving testimony in a
domestic civil proceeding when there was a real and substantial
possibility that the testimony could be used against him in a for-
132 Id
' Id. (citations omitted).
134 1d.
"' 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot sub nom. Parker v. United States,
397 U.S. 96 (1970).
137 Id.
"9 Id,9 50 F.Sd 1549 (11th Cir. 1995).
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eign criminal prosecution.4 0  Defendant Gecas invoked the
privilege during a deposition that was part of a Justice Depart-
ment investigation into whether Gecas, a resident alien, had lied
on his visa application in 1962 concerning his activities in
Lithuania during World War I1.14' The court stated that the
Fifth Amendment was intended, among other things, to prevent
the indignity that occurs when a witness is forced to incriminate
himself "out of his own mouth" and to safeguard against the
abuses which can result from overzealous prosecution.42 The
court noted that both policies were advanced when the privilege
was extended to cases involving a reasonable fear of self-
incrimination under foreign law, as it would prevent a resident
alien from incriminating himself "out of his own mouth" in a
foreign court, and it would safeguard against the potentially
abusive tactics of overzealous domestic prosecutors who are ac-
tively cooperating with foreign authorities in their efforts to
bring war criminals to justice.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Aloyzas Balsys was a resident alien who was born in Lithua-
nia and immigrated to the United States in 1961. TM On his im-
migration application, "Balsys stated that he had served in the
Lithuanian army between 1934 and 1940, and that he had lived
in hiding in Plateliai, Lithuania, between 1940 and 1944."14 He
swore under oath that the answers on his immigrant visa appli-
cation were true and correct.'4 Based on those answers, Balsys
was granted an immigrant visa,17 and he immigrated to the
United States from England onJune 30, 1961.48
"4 Id. at 1565.
.. Id at 1552-53.
12 Id. at 1564-66.
' Id The Second Circuit came to a similar conclusion in United States v. Balsys,
119 F.$d 122 (2nd Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S.Ct. 2218 (1998). See infta notes 165-90.
'4 United States v. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. 588, 590 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).







The Office of Special Investigations (OSI) is a division of
the Department ofJustice created in 1979 to investigate and in-
stitute denaturalization and deportation proceedings against
suspected Nazi war criminals.4 9 The OSI began investigating
Balsys when it came to suspect that he had deliberately lied on
his immigration application in order to conceal his assistance in
the Nazi persecution of Lithuanian citizens during World War
11.5' Specifically, the OSI suspected that Balsys was neither liv-
ing in Plateliei nor in hiding between 1940 and 1944. Rather, it
suspected that he was living in Vilnius, Lithuania during that
period as a member of the Lithuanian Security Police, which
persecuted Jews and other civilians in collaboration with the
Nazi government of Germany. 5 1 If the OSI could prove that
Balsys assisted in the persecution of persons because of their
race, religion, national origin, or political affiliation, he would
be subject to deportation.' He would also be subject to depor-
tation if the OSI could show that he lied about his activities dur-
ing World War II under oath on his immigrant visa
application.
As part of its investigation into Balsys' wartime activities, the
OSI issued an administrative subpoena ordering Balsys to testify
and to produce documents "relating to his immigration to the
United States, and to his activities in Europe between 1940 and
1945.' ' 5 Balsys appeared at a deposition and provided his name
and address, but claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination as to all other questions. He also refused to
produce the subpoenaed documents, with the exception of his
alien registration card.
56
"9 United States v. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. 588, 590 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
"0 Petitioner's Brief at 3, United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998) (No. 97-
873).
. id at 30.
152 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (3) (E) (Supp. 111996), § 1227 (a) (4) (D) (Supp. 111996).
,13 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (6) (C) (I) (Supp. II 1996) and § 1227 (a) (1) (A) (Supp. II
1996).





In refusing to testify and to produce the requested docu-
ments, Balsys contended that he was "entitled to the privilege af-
forded by the Fifth Amendment based on his fear that
answering the government's questions could subject him to
prosecution by the governments of Lithuania, Germany, and Is-
rael.' 15 7 In response, the government filed a petition for the en-
forcement of the subpoena. 158  The government argued, inter
alia, that the Fifth Amendment privilege is not applicable when
a claimant fears prosecution by a foreign government.5 9
The district court granted the government's petition and
ordered Balsys to testify.10 The court stated that "the Fifth
Amendment is not applicable extraterritorially," and that "it
serves strictly to regulate the relationship between federal and
state governments and their citizens." 6' In addition, the court
found that the primary purpose of the amendment is to prevent
domestic governments from abusing their power by eliciting
self-incriminating testimony in an inhumane fashion.162 Reason-
ing that the incentive for such governmental abuses (or "over-
reaching") disappears when the prosecution is to take place in
another country, and that the application of the privilege to
cases involving foreign prosecutions might thwart legitimate and
important domestic law enforcement efforts,10 the court ruled
that allowing Balsys to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege
would not advance the policies served by the amendment.'r
The Second Circuit reversed, vacating the district court's
order compelling Balsys to testify.'65 Citing Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission,'ts the court identified the following three general
157 Id.




'60 Balsys, 918 F. Supp. at 600.
161 Id. at 599.
162 Id.
"6 Id The court included efforts to monitor and verify immigration and visa appli-
cations among these legitimate efforts. Id.
164 id.
'6 Balsys v. United States, 119 F.3d 122, 140 (2nd Cir. 1997).
6 378 U.S. 52 (1964). See supra notes 91-126 and accompanying text.
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categories of purposes served by the Fifth Amendment: advanc-
ing individual integrity and privacy; protecting against the
state's pursuit of its goals by excessive means; and promoting
the systemic values of the American method of criminal jus-
tice.167 The court concluded that the first two of these purposes
would be well served by permitting Balsys to withhold his testi-
mony based upon his fear of foreign prosecution. 16
With respect to the purpose of advancing individual integ-
rity and privacy, the court cited two Supreme Court cases which
recognized that the Fifth Amendment serves to prevent a wit-
ness from facing the "'cruel trilemma' of self-accusation, per-
jury, or contempt."69 The court noted that this trilemma is "no
less cruel nor any less imposed by a government within the
United States merely because the testimony is ultimately used by
a foreign nation."'70 Similarly, the court stated that the "threat
to the human personality and privacy" is no less serious "simply
because the compulsion serves the purposes of a foreign gov-
ernment."'7 ' Finally, the court noted that "the privilege... bet-
ter ensures the reliability" of compelled testimony regardless of
whether the witness fears foreign or domestic prosecution,
"since self-incriminating statements are no' more reliable in ei-
ther case." 72
With respect to the purpose of preventing governmental
overreaching, the court concluded that the danger of such
overreaching can be substantial under certain circumstances
even though the prosecuting authority is a foreign government,
and that the district court had underestimated the possibility of
such overreaching occurring in this case. 73 The court noted
that "international collaboration in criminal prosecutions has
intensified . . . in recent years," and that the United States is
currently waging a "united front" with foreign countries in the
"7 Balsys, 119 F.3d at 129.
68 -. at 129-40.
69 Id. at 130 (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595-97 (1990); South Da-






prosecution of several crimes.174 This "cooperative internation-
alism" results in the United States having a "significant stake in
many foreign criminal cases."' 75 Indeed, the Second Circuit
stressed that the Balsys record revealed that the United States
had a particularly "substantial interest in the success of Balsys'
foreign prosecution"176 for several reasons. First, the OSI was
created to investigate and deport Nazi war criminals for foreign
crimes. 77  Second, the United States "has entered into an
agreement to provide evidence that it has gathered on sus-
pected Nazi collaborators to Lithuania."178 Finally, the United
States Government "has exchanged incriminating evidence on
suspected Nazi collaborators with Israel on past occasions."'179
Given this clear interest on the part of the federal government
in foreign prosecutions like the one faced by Balsys, the court
concluded that "permitting the privilege in such cases will help
curb any tendency by the United States to take abusive measures
just as it does in cases in which domestic prosecution is
feared."1 80
Moreover, the Second Circuit rejected the district court's
argument that applying the privilege in cases like the instant
case would have a seriously detrimental effect on important
domestic law enforcement initiatives. 8' Courts that have op-
posed the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to cases
involving a witness's fear of foreign prosecution have stressed
the inability of the United States to secure the witness's testi-
mony through a grant of immunity from prosecution, as the
United States does not have the power to guarantee that the tes-
timony will not be used against the witness in a foreign prosecu-
tion. 8' Such courts have often argued that this situation createsa serious threat to domestic law enforcement (and to American
74 & at 130-31.
'7-' Id. at 131.
'7' Ic.




,81 Id. at 133-36.
18
2 Id- at 134.
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sovereignty in general) which is not present in cases where a
witness invokes the privilege in a domestic proceeding.18 3 How-
ever, the Second Circuit concluded that such fears were exag-
gerated for four main reasons. First, "the circumstances giving
rise to the application of the privilege in cases involving foreign
prosecutions rarely occur." 4 In order to invoke the privilege, a
witness must establish that he faces a "real and substantial"
threat of foreign prosecution, and to do this he must show that
he would likely "be forced to enter a country disposed to prose-
cute him...... Such cases are rare. Second, testimony sought by
the United States for the purposes of domestic law enforcement
will likely be limited to an alien's domestic activities, and will
not relate to the foreign activities for which he will most likely
face prosecution abroad.ls If this is so, it follows that in most
cases in which a witness asserts the privilege for fear of incrimi-
nation abroad, the United States will retain unencumbered ac-
cess to the testimony which it seeks for domestic law
enforcement purposes. Third, "since an adverse inference may
be drawn in civil cases when a witness invokes the privilege,"
that very invocation might aid the government's case as effec-
tively as would the testimony sought.'8 7 For example, if the Gov-
ernment seeks information from a suspected Nazi collaborator
in a deportation proceeding, its ability to deport the witness is
not necessarily diminished by the witness's assertion of the privi-
lege because it may draw an adverse inference from the witness'
silence, and it may use this adverse inference-along with what-
ever other evidence it may have against him-as grounds to de-
port him. Therefore, the Government will frequently be able to
deport the witness even without obtaining his testimony. Fi-
'" See ag., United States v. Lileikis, 899 F. Supp. 802, 809 (D. Mass. 1995) (stating
that if the United States has a legitimate need for a witness's testimony, 
"[i] t would be
an unacceptable affront to the sovereignty of the United States if the operation of its
laws could be stymied by the desire of a foreign government to prosecute the same
witness.").
Balsys, 119 F.3d at 135.
"' Id. (quoting United States v. Gecas, 50 F.3d 1549, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995)). For
example, via deportation or extradition. Id.
Id. at 135-36.
"' Im at 136.
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nally, if the United States government vitally needs to compel a
witness's testimony despite his real and substantial fear of for-
eign prosecution, it may enact provisions or treaties which paral-
lel domestic immunity statutes.'8 All the United States need do
in such cases is either to "eliminate the likelihood that the wit-
ness will be sent to the jurisdiction that would prosecute him,"
or to "grant [the witness] some form of constructive immu-
nity."' 89 The United States could accomplish this by promising
not to deport or extradite the witness in exchange for receiving
his testimony.19
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the division among the circuits on the question of whether
a witness's real and substantial fear of a foreign prosecution
would allow him to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.19'
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the Court, Justice Souter 92 held that concern
with foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. 5 The Court
based its decision on two principal claims. First, it argued that
the text of the self-incrimination clause, when read in its proper
context, was meant to provide a witness with the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination when the witness reasona-
bly fears prosecution by the same government whose power the
clause limits-not by any government whatsoever. Second, the
Court found that relevant precedents require this so called
"same-sovereign" interpretation of the scope of the self-
incrimination clause.
"' Id. at 136-39.
"9 1& at 137.
"o Id. at 136.
19' United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 751 (1998).
19 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, andJustices Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined in
the opinion. Justices Scalia and Thorasjoined parts I, II, and HI of the opinion.
"' United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2236 (1998).
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The Court began its analysis with a consideration of the text
of the Fifth Amendment.194 Noting that Constitutional provi-
sions must be construed in context,195 the Court looked at the
entire text of the Fifth Amendment, and did not limit itself to a
consideration of the self-incrimination clause. The Court noted
that the self-incrimination clause occurs in the company of pro-
visions which are implicated only by actions of the government
bound by the clause, such as "guarantees of grand jury proceed-
ings, defense against double jeopardy, due process, and com-
pensation for property taking."196 Given this, the Court
reasoned that "it would have been strange to choose such asso-
ciates for a Clause meant to take a broader view.' ' 97 In addition,
the Court noted that the clause's expansive language198 can be
interpreted as distinguishing the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination from that of the right to a grand jury indict-
ment. 99 The Court concluded that the phrase "no person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself' need not, and indeed should not, be read as "taking
the further step of defining the relevant prosecutorial jurisdic-
tion internationally., 200 The Court found an international in-
terpretation of the clause's reach particularly unpersuasive
given that the Bill of Rights was originally instituted to curtail
and restrict the general powers granted to the various branches
"9 The Fifth Amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a GrandJury, except in cases arising in the land
or Naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;,
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, withoutjust compensation.
U.S. CoNsT., amend. V.
195 Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2223 (citing King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221
(1991)).
'96 I& at 2223.
197 id.
' The clause purports to apply to "any" criminal case. See supra note 194.
' Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2223. The right to a grand jury indictment is expressly lim-
ited to "capital or otherwise infamous crimes." See supra note 194.
0 Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2223.
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of the federal government in the original Constitutional articles,
and was not meant to apply to any other government.'
The Court next examined its precedents. The Court held
that its precedents established that the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination could be invoked only when the
threat of prosecution comes from the same sovereign which
sought to compel the incriminating testimony.2  While no Su-
preme Court case had addressed the issue in the context of the
threat of foreign prosecution, some cases had addressed the
analogous issue of the potential use of compelled federal testi-
mony in a state prosecution.0 The Court cited several of these
cases as ordaining the so-called "same sovereign" rule.2l
The Court cited United States v. Murdock °5 for the proposi-
tion that "one under examination in a federal tribunal could
not refuse to answer on account of probable incrimination un-
der state law."206 In Murdock, the Court stated that the English
rule of evidence against self-incrimination, which was the his-
torical basis for the Fifth Amendment privilege, "[did] not pro-
tect witnesses against disclosing offenses in violation of the laws
of another country."20 7 Applying this reasoning, the Murdock
Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment mandated only that
a witness be given "full and complete immunity against prosecu-
tion by the government compelling the witness to answer.,
208
"' Id. at 2223-24 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716
(1971)). The Court also cited Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) which held that the Constitution's "limitations on power ... are
naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government created by the in-
strument" and not to "distinct [state] governments, framed by different persons and
for different purposes."
Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2224.
2' Id at 2224-25.
Id.. (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906) and United States v. Mur-
dock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1931)) (other citations omitted.) See also supra notes 56-66
and accompanying text.
' 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933).
Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2224 (quoting Murdock, 290 U.S. at 396.)
217 Id.. at 2224-25, (citing U.S. v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931)).
20' Id. at 2225. Thus, in Murdock the Court held that the witness was entitled to
immunity from prosecution by the federal government and not the state government.
Id.
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In Balsys, the Court interpreted Murphy v. Waterfront Commis-
sion as being consistent with the same sovereign rule articulated
in Murdock. The Court acknowledged that Murphy was "invested
with two alternative rationales,"2 9 one of which can be read as
rejecting the same sovereign rule.20 However, the Court found
that Murphy's essential holding did not contradict the rule.'
The Court read Murphy as re-defining the bounds of federal and
state sovereignty in light of the incorporation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination against the
21states. 12 The Court concluded that Murphy should be read as
holding that the government may grant a defendant full immu-
nity from government prosecution in exchange for his testi-
mony so long as this grant of immunity is as broad as the
privilege against self-incrimination itself.2 13 Therefore, since the
Fifth Amendment privilege binds both state and federal prose-
cutions, a defendant offering self-incriminating testimony pur-
suant to a grant of immunity must be immune from prosecution
in both state and federal jurisdictions. 4 The jurisdiction origi-
nally granting immunity is irrelevant, since both jurisdictions
are bound by the privilege. The Court argued that Murphy ac-
tually stands for the proposition that, after Malloy v. Hogan,
215
state and federal jurisdictions must be treated as one jurisdic-
tion or sovereignty when considering the application of the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. 6
Although the Balsys Court acknowledged that Murphy con-
tained a "competing rationale" which supported the claim that
the privilege against self-incrimination applied in cases wherein
the threat of prosecution came from a foreign country,2 7 it re-
"Id. at 2226.
210 & at 2228-30.
2 Id. at 2227-28.
212 Id at 2226-28.
213 Id. at 2227.
214 Id. at 2227-28.
" 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Malloy held the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states
(see supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.)
216 Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2227-28.
217 Id. at 2228.
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jected this rationale. 8 In Murphy, the Court had stated that the
privilege against self-incrimination reflected a constitutional
policy protecting personal privacy.1 9 In Balsys, the Court re-
jected Murphy's interpretation of English common law prece-
dent20 as inconsistent with its previous understanding,22' and
argued that the privacy argument derived from Murphy was
overly expansive and ambitious.222
For example, the Court argued that the privilege cannot be
based upon a conception of any "inviolable" right to privacy be-
cause the privilege may be exchanged for immunity and be-
cause the law recognizes no such privilege when there is no
threat of criminal prosecution. 223 The Court stated that "what
we find in practice is not the protection of personal testimonial
inviolability, but a conditional protection of testimonial privacy
subject to the basic limits recognized before the framing and re-
fined through the immunity doctrine in the intervening
years."224 The Court characterized this "conditional" protection
as a time-honored strategy designed to strike a balance between
private and governmental interests.2 3 Moreover, protecting the
"inviolablity" of a witness's testimony when the witness reasona-
bly fears foreign prosecution would upset this balance of inter-
ests, because in such cases the government cannot guarantee
21 Id. at 2230.
219 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
220 For Murphy's interpretation of the English common law precedent, see supra
notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
221 Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2227-30. First, the Balsys Court noted that neither Campbell
nor Brownsword disturbed the same sovereign rule, as in each case "the judicial system
to which the witness's fears related was subject to the same legislative sovereignty that
had created the courts in which the privilege was claimed" (i.e., a British colonial
court, and a British ecclesiastical court, respectively.) Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2228-29.
Moreover, the Balsys court limited McCrae to its facts, and argued that in any event it
was irrelevant to the question at hand, as it was decided some sixty years after the
drafting of the Constitution. Id. at 2229-30.
222 The Court noted that certain limitations on the privilege have traditionally been
recognized. For example, when the Government is willing to grant a witness immu-
nity from prosecution in exchange for his testimony, the privilege grants no further
protection of testimonial privacy. Id. at 2232.
ns Id at 2232-33.




the witness immunity from prosecution in exchange for his tes-
timony, and is therefore powerless to bargain for the witness's
testimony.
226
Moreover, the Court rejected the argument that allowing
the privilege against self-incrimination to extend to cases involv-
ing a fear of foreign prosecution (or at least to cases whose facts
parallel those in Balsys) would further its undisputed policy goal
of preventing government "overreaching. 2 27  The Court ac-
knowledged that an important goal behind the privilege is to
prevent a government which is eager to prosecute a defendant
from resorting to abusive coercion in order to compel the de-
fendant to provide self-incriminating testimony that would aid
in his prosecution. Balsys argued that because the United States
government now collaborates extensively with foreign govern-
ments in bringing war criminals to justice, it has a significant in-
terest in seeing such individuals convicted abroad for their
crimes, and such an incentive had traditionally required appli-
cation of the privilege in the context of domestic prosecu-
tions.2  Balsys cited Murphy's concern with "cooperative
federalism"2 in this context, and argued that the current system
of "cooperative internationalism" in the war crimes context
raises the very same concerns.20
The Court rejected this reasoning, noting that the Murphy
court's concern with "cooperative federalism" was motivated
solely by Malloy's application of the Fifth Amendment to the
states, and not by any general concerns about government over-
reaching. 3' Murphy concluded that, because Malloy held the
states and the federal government to the same law regarding
self-incrimination, "it would be unjustifiably formalistic for a
federal court to ignore fear of [a] state prosecution when ruling
226 id.
22 Id. at 2233-34.
" The term "cooperative federalism" refers to the collaboration of state and fed-
eral authorities in prosecutions. See Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52,
55-56 (1964).




on a privilege claim."23 2 In Balsys, the Court contended that, be-
cause the Fifth Amendment is not imposed beyond domestic
governments, the invocation of Murphy's "cooperative federal-
ism" concerns was inapposite.23
However, the Court conceded that cooperative conduct be-
tween the United States and a foreign nation could conceivably
rise to a level which would justify a witness's invoking the privi-
lege in a domestic proceeding when he reasonably feared for-
eign prosecution.2 4 The Court hypothesized a situation wherein
the United States and its allies had "enacted substantially similar
criminal codes aimed at prosecuting offenses of international
character," and the United States government granted immu-
nity from domestic prosecution "for the purpose of obtaining
evidence to be delivered to other nations as prosecutors of a
crime common to both countries."2- In such a case, the prose-
cution would not be truly foreign, but would be brought in
large part by the same sovereign that was seeking to compel the
witness's testimony.236 However, the Court insisted that Balsys
was not such a case, as a mere interest in a foreign prosecution
"does not rise to the level of cooperative prosecution."2
7
B. JUSTICE STEVENS'S CONCURRENCE
In his brief concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stressed an
unpalatable consequence of Balsys' interpretation of the self-
incrimination clause, asserting that such an interpretation
would "confer power on foreign governments to impair the ad-
ministration of justice in this country. 2m For example, "a law
enacted by a foreign power making it a crime for one of its citi-
zens to testify in an American proceeding against another citi-
zen of that country would immunize those citizens from being
compelled to provide such testimony in an American court," as
doing so could subject them to criminal prosecution in their na-
232 id.sId.
233
2" Id. at 2235.
"'s Id.
2 6 id.
27 Id. at 2235-36.
m Id. at 2236 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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rive country.29 In addition, Justice Stevens contended that the
primary purpose of the self-incrimination clause.., is to protect
persons "whose liberty has been placed in jeopardy in an
American tribunal," and that the Balsys holding will not ad-
versely affect the fairness of any such American criminal trial.4
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S DISSENT
Justice Ginsburg dissented, emphasizing that the privilege
against self-incrimination embodies principles of "fundamental
decency" and expresses "our view of civilized government con-
duct.,241 As such, the privilege should "command the respect of
United States interrogators, whether the prosecution reasonably
feared by the examinee is domestic or foreign."242 In other
words, Justice Ginsburg argued that, even though the Fifth
Amendment's self-incrimination clause binds only American
authorities, American interrogators are included among those
authorities, and thus the clause could be properly invoked to
prevent OSI interrogators from compelling Balsys' testimony.4
D. JUSTICE BREYER'S DISSENT
Justice Breyer dissented,244 taking issue with the majority's
interpretation of Murphy. Justice Breyer argued that Murphy
had explicitly rejected the same sovereign rule articulated by
Murdock and reasserted by the majority,245and thait Murphy's re-
jection of the Murdock holding was based on a fundamentally
different understanding of the basic policies advanced by the
self-incrimination clause, and not, as the majority would have it,
on a new concept of federal-state "sovereignty" in light of Mal-
/oy.246 In its analysis of the English common-law precedents,
Murphy had sought to establish that the self-incrimination clause
29 Id (Stevens,J., concurring).
240 Id (Stevens,J., concurring).
241 Id at 2237 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing E. GmswoLD, THE FIFH AMNDMENT
TODAY, 8, 9 (1955)).
22 Id. (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
2 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
'"Justice Ginsburgjoined injustice Breyer's dissent.
"' Id. at 2237-39 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
26 Id. at 2239 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
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was meant to protect individuals against having their own testi-
mony used against them in any prosecution, regardless of
whether the prosecution was undertaken by the same sovereign
seeking to compel the testimony or by a foreign sovereign.247
Justice Breyer contended that this interpretation of the English
precedents was at least as sound as the interpretation offered by
the Murdock Court and by the majority.248 In addition, since
Murphy remains good law, the burden was on the majority to re-
fute Murphy's interpretation.49 Justice Breyer asserted that the
majority had failed to carry this burden, and that Balsys there-
fore could not be compelled to testify against himself.2°
In addition, Justice Breyer claimed that holding the privi-
lege against self-incrimination applicable in Balsys' case would
further several important policies underlying the self-
incrimination clause.2s For example, it would help to prevent
government overreaching and would reinforce the preference
for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of crimi-
naljustice.s
With respect to these policy goals, Justice Breyer stated that
the extensive cooperation between the United States and for-
eign governments concerning the foreign prosecution of war
criminals raises overreaching concerns just as powerful as
those prevailing in the domestic arena. 4 He also noted that the
Court has ruled that "the Fifth Amendment affords individuals
protection during the investigation, as well as the trial, of a
crime, ' 2-" and that the value of such protection would stand di-
minished if a defendant were not allowed to invoke the privilege
217 Id. at 2239-40 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
248 Id, at 2241 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
241Id at 2239 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
2'0 Id at 2239, 2242 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
21 Id at 2242 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
1
2 Id. at 2243-44 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
's Evidence of the American concern with such prosecution includes Congress's
passage of deportation laws and the creation of federal agencies like the OSI, whose
mandate is to assist in foreign prosecutorial efforts. Id. at 2243 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing).
Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
'5 I& at 2244 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).
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against self-incrimination while the United States built a case
against him, simply because his prosecution would ultimately be
brought by a foreign government.
25 6
V. ANALYSIS
United States v. Balsys was wrongly decided. In developing its
"same sovereign" interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's privi-
lege against self-incrimination, the Balsys majority misread the
controlling precedents, Murphy v. Waterfront Commissionr7 in par-
ticular, and failed to give sufficient emphasis to some essential
policies advanced by the privilege. 8
A. THE MAJORITY MISREAD MURPHYAND OTHER PRECEDENTS
The Balsys majority claimed that Murphy's essential holding
was consistent with United States v. MurdocA 9 and its progeny, in
that Murphy had simply applied a version of the same sovereign
rule to new circumstances.2 ° Specifically, the Balsys majority as-
serted that, as Malloy v. Hogan2 6' had incorporated the Fifth
Amendment against the states, both the federal and the state
governments were for the first time bound by the privilege, and
therefore they could no longer be considered "separate sover-
eigns" for purposes of the application of the privilege. 62 Thus,
it was no longer appropriate to allow one sovereign within the
federal structure to compel testimony that could be used against
the defendant by the other sovereign.263 However, the Balsys ma-
jority contended that this result did not overrule the same sov-
ereign rationale of Murdock and its progeny.2  The Balsys
majority read Murphy not as a rejection of the claim that the
privilege can only be invoked when the sovereign seeking to
compel the testimony is the same sovereign which will use the
I"" (BreyerJ. dissenting).
27 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
See infra notes 289-300 and accompanying text.
2" 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
26 Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2226-28.
" 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.





testimony, but rather as a recognition that the federal and state
governments can no longer be treated as separate sovereigns.2
In sum, the Balsys majority read the Murphy holding as essen-
tially nothing more than a necessary consequence of Malloy.
While the Balsys Court did recognize a "competing rationale" in
Murphy (which based the holding on a reading of precedent
that was inconsistent with Murdock and its progeny and on a
consideration of the historical policies undergirding the privi-
lege), the Court de-emphasized the importance of this "alterna-
tive rationale" to the Murphy holding.
Contrary to the majority's reading, however, Murphy was not
simply a necessary consequence of Malloy. Rather, its "alterna-
tive rationale" was central to its holding, and it stands as an in-
dependent rejection of the same sovereign rule. In Murphy, the
Court explicitly announced the centrality of its policy analysis to
its holding.267 Near the beginning of its opinion, after raising
the question of whether one jurisdiction within our federal
structure may compel a witness to give testimony which might
incriminate him under the laws of another such jurisdiction, the
Court stated that "[t] he answer to this question must depend, of
course, on whether such an application of the privilege pro-
motes or defeats its policies and purposes. ''268 It then analyzed
the historical purposes of the privilege and of Supreme Court
precedent.269 This analysis led the Court to conclude that one
jurisdiction within our federal structure could not compel a
witness to give testimony which might incriminate him in an-
other such jurisdiction.270 In addition, Murphy took great pains
to show that Murdock and its progeny had misread both the rele-
vant precedents-including the English cases, 71 United States v.
26I at 2227-28.
266 Id. at 2228.
267 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 54.
1& at 55-77.
70 1& at 77.
27' United States v. McGrae, L.R., 3 Ch. App. 79 (1867); Brownsword v. Edwards, 28
Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750); East India Company v. Campbell, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex.
1749). See supra notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
1130 [Vol. 89
1999] FIFTHAMENDMENT/FOREJGNPROSECUTIONS
Saline Bank of Virginia,27 and Ballmann v. Fagin27 -- and the his-
torical purposes of the privilege.27 4 Given that Murphy opened
with a declaration of the centrality of the policy/precedent
analysis, and devoted some two-thirds of its opinion to that
analysis (a substantial portion of which sharply criticized Mur-
dock and its progeny), it is difficult to justify the claims that Mur-
phy was merely a necessary consequence of Malloy and that its
policy and precedent analyses were mere "alternative rationales"
which were not essential to its holding. Indeed, if such an in-
terpretation were accurate, one should wonder why the Murphy
Court bothered to criticize Murdock's rationale in the first place,
rather than simply stating that Murdock was once good law but
that it is no longer so in light of Malloy.
Moreover, the Balsys majority misread other Supreme Court
precedents. Contrary to the majority's interpretation, Saline
Bank and Ballmann support the view that a sovereign bound by
the Fifth Amendment cannot compel testimony which can be
used by another sovereign which is not bound by the Amendment.
Ballmann and Saline Bank were decided before Malloy had in-
corporated the Fifth Amendment against the states. Therefore,
at the time of those decisions, state governments were not
bound by the Fifth Amendment. Nevertheless, in each case, the
Court held that a witness's testimony could not be compelled in
a federal proceeding when there was a reasonable possibility
that it could be used against him in a state proceeding.Y Such
decisions cannot be explained on a "same sovereign" reading;
they can only be explained by some broader policy rationale.Y
The majority attempted to explain this away by claiming that the
Ballmann holding was "equivocal" in that it recognized that the
witness might be subject to incrimination in both state and fed-
eral courts, and therefore its true rationale for applying the
26 U.S. 100 (1828). See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
200 U.S. 186 (1906). See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
27 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 57-77.
' 5 Ballman, 200 U.S. at 195-96; Saline Bank, 26 U.S. at 104.
2"6 One possible policy rationale that might explain these holdings is the avoidance
of forcing a witness into the "cruel trilemma" of self-accusation, perjury, and con-




privilege might have been a desire to protect the witness from
prosecution by the federal sovereign which was seeking to com-
pel his testimony. 7  However, the Ballmann Court explicitly
stated that the privilege would protect the witness from testify-
ing "[o]ne way or the other," that is, whether he would face
prosecution by federal or state authorities27 Moreover, the ma-
jority's attempt to explain away Saline Bank is equally unsatisfy-
ing. The majority disregarded Saline Bank as inapposite,
arguing that it might have involved the interpretation of a state
statute prohibiting self-incrimination, rather than an interpreta-
tion of the Fifth Amendment.27 However, several subsequent
Supreme Court cases relied upon the chancery rule against self-
incrimination cited by Saline Bank in determining the scope of
the Fifth Amendment privilege, 280 and Murphy read Saline Bank
as construing the scope of the Amendment.
2 '
In addition, the majority's same sovereign interpretation of
the privilege cannot be reconciled with at least one other
precedent which neither the majority nor the Murphy Court had
considered. Brain v. United States22 held that testimony which
was compelled in a coercive manner by a foreign sovereign
could not be used against a defendant in an American (federal)
proceeding.8 Brain cannot be explained with reference to the
same sovereign rule, for that rule would establish that the using
sovereign is free to use the testimony so long as it did not par-
ticipate in the compulsion of the testimony. 4 The Brain deci-
sion must therefore turn on the application of some broader
policy, such as an effort to preserve a defendant's dignitary right
'"United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (1998).
2,8Ballmann, 200 U.S. at 195-96.
279Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2225-26.
280 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 631 (1886); see also Diane M. Amman, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways; the
Privilege Against Self-incrimination in an International Contex 45 UCLA L. REv. 1201,
1209 n.40 (1998).
2" Murphy, 378 U.S. 52, 69.
282 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
2 2 Id. at 565.
2" This is precisely the conclusion that the Court reached in Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487, 492 (1944) when applying the same sovereign rule to similar
facts.
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not to be coerced into incriminating himself-regardless of
which sovereign does the coercing-or an endeavor to preserve
the truth and accuracy of a defendant's confessions. The major-
ity's same sovereign interpretation of the Fifth Amendment ad-
vances neither of these policies.s
B. THE MAJORITY'S INTERPRETATION FAILS TO PROMOTE
IMPORTANT POLICIES UNDERLYING THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION
In adopting the same sovereign rule, the Balsys majority in-
terpreted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination extremely narrowly. It found that the privilege
provides only a limited protection for a defendant's dignitary
right to privacy, rather than the more broad protections dis-
cussed in Murphy.85 And, while it conceded that the Fifth
Amendment prevents the government from abusing its power
while attempting to coerce a defendant's confession, it con-
tended that the Amendment's reach was rather narrow and lim-
ited in this context.28 7 For the majority, the Fifth Amendment
prohibits the government not from forcing the individual to in-
criminate himself in general, but only from compelling him to
give testimony which might be used against him by the compel-
ling sovereign itself or by another sovereign that is bound by the
privilege. s Such a reading does not promote some of the cen-
tral purposes of the privilege, at least one of which can be seen
as both a personal dignitary right and as a check on government.
One such purpose is to protect the individual from facing
the "cruel trilemma" of self-accusation, perjury, and contempt.289
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the Fifth
Amendment privilege prohibits the government from putting
2" See infra notes 289-97 and accompanying text.
2" Balsys, 118 S. Ct at 2232. "[WIhat we find in practice is not the protection of
personal testimonial inviolability, but a conditional protection of testimonial privacy
subject to basic limits recognized before the framing [footnote omitted] and refined
through the immunity doctrine in the intervening years." Id.
2 Id. at 2232-33.
2M id.
' See; e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595-97 (1990); South Dakota v.




the witness in a position whereby he must choose to either in-
criminate himself "by his own mouth," lie (and face perjury
charges), or refuse to testify (and face contempt charges.) 2
Thus, it can be argued that the privilege serves as both a check
on government abuse of power, and as a protector of a personal
dignitary right. It checks government abuses by prohibiting the
state from using its considerable power to attempt to coerce de-
sired testimony out of a witness. It protects a personal dignitary
right by guaranteeing that an individual will not be forced to
participate in his own conviction by providing self-incriminating
testimony, under threat of criminal sanction for refusal to do so.
These policies are undermined whenever the state forces a wit-
ness to choose between furnishing evidence against himself or
facing criminal sanctions for either refusing to do so or for ly-
ing. Moreover, a Fifth Amendment violation occurs whenever
the government puts the witness in this position, regardless of the
eventual use made of the testimony2 1 The prohibited govern-
mental abuse of power and the violation of the witness's digni-
tary right occurs at the moment of attempted compulsion, and not at
the moment that the compelled testimony is actually used
against the witness in a criminal proceeding.
The Court's view fails to recognize this central purpose of
the Fifth Amendment. By adopting the same sovereign view,
the Court reads the privilege as guaranteeing only that the gov-
ernment bound by the privilege will not compel testimony from
a witness if the testimony could be used against the witness by
another sovereign bound by the privilege. 2 Under this view, a
2' See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 595-97; Neville, 459 U.S. at 561-64. But see RonaldJ. Allen,
The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process, and Magic Bullets, 67 U. COLO.
L. REV. 989, 1016-17 (1996) (arguing that since only the guilty will experience the
compulsion to testify as a "cruel trilemma," forcing a defendant to testify about his
own alleged involvement in a crime is a violation of the Fifth Amendment only if we
believe that the Amendment is designed to reduce the probability of punishing the
guilty); David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-incrimination?, 33
UCLA L. REv. 1063, 1093-1095 (1986) (arguing that compelled self-incrimination is
no more "cruel" than are other, legally permitted acts of compelling a witness's testi-
mony).
2' See United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 130 (2nd Cir. 1997). "[The cruel] tri-
lemma is no less cruel nor any less imposed by a government within the United States
merely because the testimony is ultimately used by a foreign nation." Id.
United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2232-33 (1998).
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government bound by the privilege may compel a witness's tes-
timony so long as neither it, nor another government bound by
the privilege, can use the testimony against the witness. This
view is inadequate for two reasons. First, it fails to recognize
that the Fifth Amendment violation occurs at the moment that the
witness faces the "cruel trilemma."23 Second, it fails to appreciate
that the witness faces the trilemma whenever he must choose
between self-incrimination, perjury, and contempt, regardless of
where his eventual prosecution will occur. As such, the Balsys
rule neither protects the individual's dignitary right not to have
to choose between participating in his own conviction or facing
a sanction, nor prevents the government from abusing its
power.
The majority declined to locate such wide-ranging purposes
in the Fifth Amendment, preferring to characterize the
Amendment mainly as a device whose primary purpose is to
check a rather narrow range of domestic governmental
abuses.f4 The majority rejected the argument that the privilege
was intended to safeguard global dignitary rights. 5 It argued
that the Fifth Amendment jurisprudence does not support the
argument that the Amendment was meant to protect an inviola-
ble enclave of privacy because it has always allowed the compul-
sion of testimony when a grant of immunity was made; that is, it
has always allowed the government to trade the individual's
right to remain silent for a grant of immunity.m However, the
individual right advanced by the amendment is not a right to
testimonial privacy per se, but rather a right not to be subjected
to the "cruel trilemma," or a right not to face the choice be-
tween conviction by one's silence or by one's own words. This
"' See generally Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595-97 (1990); South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 561-64 (1983). But see Randall D. Guynn, Note, The Reach of the
Fifth Amendment Privilege When Domestically Compelled Testimony May Be Used in a Foreign
Countty's Court; 69 VA. L. REv. 875, 876-77 (1983) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is limited by the requirement that it applies only when a Constitutionally
proscribed use of the compelled testimony would likely follow, and that use by a for-
eign government is not a Constitutionally proscribed use).




right is advanced by a grant of immunity that is truly coextensive
with the privilege; such a grant of immunity effectively removes
one horn of the "trilemma" by insuring that the accused cannot
be convicted based upon his testimony. Therefore, pointing to
the practice of exchanging testimony for immunity is not an ar-
gument against the claim that the essential purpose of the
Amendment is to protect a fundamental dignitary right. 7
In addition, while the majority acknowledged that a central
purpose of the Fifth Amendment is to protect against govern-
mental abuses in extracting self-incriminating testimony, its ad-
herence to the same sovereign rule led it to disregard the
serious potential for such abuses in the context of current in-
ternational law enforcement efforts.28 In particular, the major-
ity sets the bar too high in determining when "cooperative
internationalism" becomes a Fifth Amendment concern. The
majority's rather formalistic adherence to the "same sovereign"
rule leads it to conclude that cooperative internationalism can
only raise Fifth Amendment concerns when the cooperation is
so extensive that the federal government becomes a bona fide
co-prosecutor of the defendant (that is, when the United States
and a foreign sovereign share substantially similar criminal
codes and collaborate extensively in enforcing those laws.) m
However, as the Second Circuit noted, the current level of co-
operation between the United States and foreign governments,
while perhaps falling short of the majority's rather extreme
standard, raises legitimate Fifth Amendment concerns. 0 0 The
United States currently has a strong interest in assisting the
' Moreover, while the majority is right to note that the privacy of a witness's testi-
mony is not "inviolable" under Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, there arguably re-
mains an important sense in which the Amendment protects an "inviolable" privacy
right. It is not a personal right to testimonial privacy per se that is "inviolable;"
rather, it is a right having to do with the state-individual relation that is "inviolable."
The right of the witness to withhold the testimony may be exchanged for immunity;
however, the right not to be put in the "cruel trilemma" cannot be exchanged for
anything. In other words, the state can permissibly compel testimony (via a grant of
immunity), but it cannot permissibly compel self-incriminating testimony.
Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2234-35.
Id. at 2235.
' United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 130-31 (2nd Cir. 1997). See also Amman,
supra note 279, at 1275-76.
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prosecutorial efforts of many foreign countries, and as such, it
has a strong incentive to abuse its power by coercing a witness's
testimony. It is precisely this sort of "prosecution hunger"-
along with its tendency to motivate coercive abuses-that the
privilege seeks to hold in check.
C. ALLOWING A WITNESS TO INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION WHEN HE HAS A REASONABLE FEAR OF
FOREIGN PROSECUTION WOULD NOT UPSET THE STATE-
INDIVIDUAL BALANCE.
The Balsys majority asserted that allowing Balsys to invoke
the privilege for fear of foreign prosecution would upset the
balance between the interests of the government and those of
the individual which the Fifth Amendment jurisprudence seeks
to preserve."' In Kastigar v. United States"' the Court noted that
courts have long allowed the government to exchange the privi-
lege for a grant of immunity which provides the witness with
protections that are fully co-extensive with those guaranteed by
the privilege, and that such a practice preserves the important
balance between state and individual interestsY.30 The Balsys ma-
jority contended that allowing Balsys to claim the privilege
would upset the state-individual balance by making it impossible
for the government to trade immunity for important testimony,
as it could not guarantee use and derivative use immunity in a
foreign court.3 0 4 This does not protect the government's inter-
est in obtaining testimony, and opens the door for abuses of the
system by both foreign criminals and foreign governments in
ways that would be an affront to United States sovereignty.'0
However, there are pragmatic alternatives to domestic im-
munity statutes in the international context. For example, the
United States government could grant "constructive immunity"
by keeping compelled testimony under seal, by refusing to pro-
vide certified copies of the testimony to the prosecuting foreign
so' Balsys, 118 S. CL at 2232.
406 U.S. 441 (1972).
& I at 445-47.
Balsys, 118 S. CL at 2232.




government, by obtaining a promise from the foreign govern-
ment not to use the compelled testimony, or by declining to ex-
tradite the witness to the foreign country seeking to prosecute
him.3l
Moreover, neither Kastigar nor any other Supreme Court
case holds that a witness's privilege against self-incrimination
depends upon the government's ability to obtain his testimony
via a grant of immunity. Kastigar stated that immunity statutes
have traditionally been upheld to protect government interests
in obtaining important testimony, and that they are an effort to
balance state and individual interests. 7 However, it requires an
additional leap of logic to claim that if such immunity cannot be
granted, then the government interest prevails and the individ-
ual can be compelled to testify. No case has upheld the gov-
ernment's right to compel self-incriminating testimony from a
defendant in the absence of a grant of immunity that is truly co-
extensive with the right granted to the individual under the
amendment. Moreover, no case has held that the government's
interest in obtaining the testimony outweighs the individual's
interest in not being forced to participate in his own prosecu-
tion by providing self-incriminating testimony.3 8 The Fifth
Amendmentjurisprudence does not rule that the Constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination must bend to practical con-
siderations. The Balsys majority simply assumes all of these
premises, but one might equally well assume that Kastigar and
other precedents stand for the proposition that if the govern-
ment does not have the power to grant an immunity from fu-
ture prosecution that is co-extensive with the privilege granted
by the amendment, then it does not have the Constitutional
authority to compel the witness's testimony.
None of this is meant to suggest that the government can
never compel the testimony of someone who reasonably fears
See, e.g., Balsys, 118 S. Ct. at 2245 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
37 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 445-47.
' Kastigar says only that allowing states to compel testimony under a proper im-
munity grant is a good balance because it allows the government to get the testimony
while simultaneously safeguarding the individual right as effectively as would his si-
lence; such grants of immunity take away the very threat that the Fifth Amendment
was designed to eliminate. Id at 458-59.
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self-incrimination in a foreign country. On the contrary, it can
do so if, following Kastigar, it can somehow grant the equivalent
of use and derivative use immunity. Nor must the government
prevent the foreign prosecution from occurring or, for that
matter, prevent the defendant's extradition to the foreign coun-
try seeking to prosecute him. It must only seek to insure, if it
does compel his testimony, that neither the testimony nor its
fruits are used in the foreign prosecution.
Another important point bears mentioning. The Supreme
Court has recognized that another purpose of the privilege is to
secure the reliability of testimony and thereby to promote effec-
tive law enforcement."' Failing to extend the privilege to cases
involving a legitimate fear of foreign prosecution would under-
cut this goal as well. Witnesses facing foreign prosecution for
serious offenses might often opt to remain silent and face con-
tempt charges or to perjure themselves rather than provide ac-
curate testimony which would incriminate them abroad. This
seems particularly likely if the United States will deport or ex-
tradite the defendant, as in Balsys's case.
VI. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Balsys,310 the majority misinterpreted Mur-
phy v. Waterfront Comissions' and, without clearly overruling it, re-
introduced an interpretation of the self-incrimination clause
that Murphy had explicitly rejected. Murphy did not see its hold-
ing as merely a necessary consequence of Malloy which was con-
sistent with the "same sovereign" interpretation of the privilege.
Rather, the Murphy decision was premised primarily upon a rec-
ognition of certain historical purposes underlying the privilege,
and upon an analysis of precedent which explicitly rejected the
same sovereign interpretation. A proper reading of Murphy and
of other precedents favors the view that the protections against
self-incrimination embodied in the Fifth Amendment were
' See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (noting "our dis-
trust of self-deprecatory statements").
310 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998).
" 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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meant to apply to cases wherein the threat of prosecution comes
from a foreign jurisdiction.
In refusing to allow Balsys to invoke the privilege, the Court
failed to implement some essential policies behind the privilege.
Most notably, the Court's holding fails to recognize that a cen-
tral purpose behind the amendment is preventing the govern-
ment from using its power to place a witness into the "cruel
trilemma" of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt. This policy
seeks both to prevent governmental abuses and to protect the
dignitary rights of the individual. By rigidly adhering to the
"same sovereign" view, the Court was forced to interpret the
privilege in an unduly narrow manner which was unresponsive
to both the governmental and the personal applications of the
privilege.
The Court claimed that allowing Balsys to invoke the privi-
lege would upset the balance between governmental and private
interests which is preserved by allowing the government to ex-
change a witness's right to silence with a grant of immunity.
However, Fifth Amendmentjurisprudence does not support the
claim that when such immunity cannot be granted, the witness's
privilege must yield to the government's interest in obtaining
his testimony. In addition, some workable, practical equivalents
to domestic immunity statues might be developed which would
eliminate the problem and preserve the government-individual
balance.
Steven J. Winger
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